Skills/ClawHub/jl-video-downloader

jl-video-downloader@1.0.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "多平台视频下载和文案提取工具。支持抖音、快手、小红书、B站、YouTube等平台的视频下载和语音转文字功能。当用户需要下载视频、提取视频文案或批量处理视频时激活此技能。" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher pyzxs · publishing for 231 daysInstalls 839Last detonated 11 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.0sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:303 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo yum install ffmpegFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/download.sh:82 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files$0 batch urls.txt -o ./outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:344 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x download.sh setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:289 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:289 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:38 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:56 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " CentOS/RHEL: sudo yum install ffmpeg"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:38 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup.sh:158 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$loader_file"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:297 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install ffmpegFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt-get install ffmpeg"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:353 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/jl-video-downloader/scripts/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,762 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pyzxs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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