Skills/ClawHub/ip-address-reputation-risk

ip-address-reputation-risk@2.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "在本地或经确认的外部查询中核查单个已授权公网IP的归属、路由与网络风险信号" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jianfuli · publishing for 94 daysInstalls 439Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install ip-address-reputation-risk
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:110 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresvalues or bypass the restriction.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_ip_intelligence.py:120 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/?q=8.8.8.8",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_audit.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/faq.md:57 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measures · informational: not an instruction fileDo not bypass the restriction or use a mirror. Keep the provider state unavailable and record theFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,712 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.