Skills/ClawHub/innerwarden-security

innerwarden-security@1.0.8

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Install, verify and run InnerWarden on the machine this OpenClaw agent runs on. InnerWarden Community (free, 1.6.11 or newer) screens this agent's own exec, process, write, edit and apply_patch calls before they run, through its innerwarden-guard plugin on OpenClaw's before_tool_call hook (OpenClaw 2026.9.7 or newer), and the calls it makes to its MCP servers through the proxy. Monitor first; enforce is the owner's choice. InnerWarden Pro (paid, Linux) adds the host layer with the kernel Execution Gate. Use when your owner asks to install InnerWarden, check what it protects here, see what it refused, ask whether a command is safe to run, turn on enforce, upgrade it, or remove it." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher maiconburn · publishing for 153 daysInstalls 1,556Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:124 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceinnerwarden check "rm -rf /" # must come back denyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:187 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo innerwarden-ctl agent connect --unit <OpenClaw's systemd unit>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:64 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://innerwarden.com/free | sh # signed binary, checked before install, no root, ~/.local/binFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:197 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges`sudo innerwarden-ctl arm --check` (the second changes nothing).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:216 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"Removing it"), then `sudo innerwarden-ctl uninstall`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:64 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://innerwarden.com/free | sh # signed binary, checked before install, no root, ~/.local/binFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:124 · Destructive file system command detectedinnerwarden check "rm -rf /" # must come back denyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:196 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesHealth on a Pro host: `sudo innerwarden-ctl get status` andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,723 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim maiconburn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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