imagegen-swarm@1.4.4
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Indie devs, creators, sellers: pool AI image quotas into one batch that keeps going if one runs out. Use when the user asks to generate an image, draw, edit an image, use reference images, make a video, or do text-to-image or text-to-video. Also use when the request names Codex, Grok, Grok Imagine, Gemini, nano banana, Antigravity, Jimeng, Dreamina, Muse, Lovart, gpt-image, or a pay-per-image API. Jimeng and Grok can make video. An optional pay-per-image API line (OpenAI or Gemini API) runs when a job names api, or when no enabled subscription engine can take that job. Jimeng can edit from up to 10 reference images. Antigravity Gemini edits up to 3 reference images. The optional paid Gemini API allows 3 references for gemini-2.5-flash-image and 14 for later Gemini image models. For a shared character, brand, mascot, or cover series, ask before enabling series mode. Not for crop, resize, convert, or other ordinary local image processing." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
What changed since 1.2.10
vet-skills diff imagegen-swarm 1.2.10 1.4.4In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.2.10 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.4.4 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 53/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collects environment variables by secret-like names. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
? { ...env, [probe.keyEnv]: process.env[probe.keyEnv] } : env;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (process.platform !== 'win32' && mode !== 0o600) throw new Error("not_configured: " + (config.keyFile) + " must be chmod 600 (now " + (mode.toString(8)) + ")");Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if (!options.json) process.stdout.write(output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.`project-rename` update `$HOME/.lovart/state.json` and, when access keys are present, also sendFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…ck | Same as the engine it probes. For Codex it only tests that `CODEX_HOME/auth.json` exists | No prompts or images in probe-only mode. The paid-line check sends only the key | | `smoke.mjs` or `check.mjs --live` | The checks above and th…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.if (mode & 0o044) process.stderr.write("WARNING: Lovart credentials are readable by group/others; use chmod 600 on the credentials file.\n");Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.const kill = () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.writeFileSync(path.join(directory, "SMOKE_TABLE.txt"), output, { mode: 0o600 });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
27 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ekko237: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.