Skills/ClawHub/huo15-wecom-plugin

huo15-wecom-plugin@2.9.5

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "火一五·企业微信(WeCom)OpenClaw 插件 v2.8.25 — 默认走 Bot WebSocket(响应快、配置简单),自带加密媒体解密 / Agent 主动发消息 / 微信客服三通道接入 / 多账号切换。v2.8.25 重点:GUIDANCE 优先级翻转回 MEDIA: 直发——v2.8.22 当时担..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zhaobod1 · publishing for 222 daysInstalls 1,727Last detonated 16 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/outbound.ts:865 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[wecom-outbound] Empty text, nothing to send to ${String(to ?? "")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/transport/agent-api/core.ts:530 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[wecom-upload] Multipart body size=${body.length}, boundary=${boundary}, fileContentType=${fileContentType}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/release.sh:172 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeif ! npx tsc --noEmit 2>&1 | tee /tmp/release-typecheck.log; thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/transport/agent-api/core.ts:518 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[wecom-upload] Uploading media: originalType=${type} effectiveType=${effectiveType} filename=${safeFilename}, size=${buffer.length} bytes, corpId=${agent.corpId}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/release.sh:170 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codelog_step "[6/11] typecheck (npx tsc --noEmit)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/test-proxy.ts:24 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxyUrl = `http://${encodeURIComponent(user)}:${encodeURIComponent(pass)}@${host}:${port}`;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/onboarding.ts:311 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"👨‍💻 作者: YanHaidao (微信: YanHaidao)",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/transport/agent-api/core.ts:545 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[wecom-upload] Response:`, JSON.stringify(json));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/agent/api-client.upload.test.ts:47 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesit("uses text/plain for .txt uploads", async () => {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈779 tok
1 file · 246 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zhaobod1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim zhaobod1Propose a patch to the maintainer