huo15-wecom-plugin@2.9.5
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "火一五·企业微信(WeCom)OpenClaw 插件 v2.8.25 — 默认走 Bot WebSocket(响应快、配置简单),自带加密媒体解密 / Agent 主动发消息 / 微信客服三通道接入 / 多账号切换。v2.8.25 重点:GUIDANCE 优先级翻转回 MEDIA: 直发——v2.8.22 当时担..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
console.log(`[wecom-outbound] Empty text, nothing to send to ${String(to ?? "")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`[wecom-upload] Multipart body size=${body.length}, boundary=${boundary}, fileContentType=${fileContentType}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if ! npx tsc --noEmit 2>&1 | tee /tmp/release-typecheck.log; thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log(`[wecom-upload] Uploading media: originalType=${type} effectiveType=${effectiveType} filename=${safeFilename}, size=${buffer.length} bytes, corpId=${agent.corpId}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.log_step "[6/11] typecheck (npx tsc --noEmit)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.proxyUrl = `http://${encodeURIComponent(user)}:${encodeURIComponent(pass)}@${host}:${port}`;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."👨💻 作者: YanHaidao (微信: YanHaidao)",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.console.log(`[wecom-upload] Response:`, JSON.stringify(json));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.it("uses text/plain for .txt uploads", async () => {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zhaobod1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.