Skills/ClawHub/hummingbot-developer

hummingbot-developer@1.0.0

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Developer skill for running Hummingbot and Gateway from source, building wheel and Docker images, and testing against Hummingbot API running from source. Use..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to repo.anaconda.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher fengtality · publishing for 264 daysInstalls 1,308Last detonated 33 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 41/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: sends data to repo.anaconda.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 19 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/build_all.sh: line 80: cd: /tmp/ks-detonate-sgGZVk/scripts/home/.openclaw/workspace/hummingbot: No such file or directory
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1snetworkGET http://localhost:8000/health · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1snetworkGET http://localhost:8000/health · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.7sfilesystemread ~/work/.corepack.env · ~/work/package.json · ~/.corepack.env · ~/package.json · ~/.cache/node/corepack/lastKnownGood.json · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm outside project
1.7sfilesystemwrote ~/.cache/node/corepack/lastKnownGood.json · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/corepack-6460-a7fb457d.95a4d/dist/node_modules/undici/lib/llhttp/.gitkeep · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/corepack-6460-a7fb457d.95a4d/dist/node_modules/.bin/get-pnpm · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/corepack-6460-a7fb457d.95a4d/dist/node_modules/node-gyp/gyp/gyp · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/corepack-6460-a7fb457d.95a4d/dist/node_modules/@isaacs/fs-minipass/LICENSE · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/corepack-6460-a7fb457d.95a4d/dist/node_modules/abbrev/LICENSE
1.7snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
1.7sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/pnpm
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
1.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
1.7sprocessexited 1:
1.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.8snetworkGET http://localhost:15888/ · not in the allow-list, refused
1.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
1.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.8sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/workspace/hummingbot/hummingbot/core/utils/ outside project
1.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
1.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
1.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
1.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
3.4sfilesystemread ~/work/.corepack.env · ~/work/package.json · ~/.corepack.env · ~/package.json · ~/.cache/node/corepack/lastKnownGood.json · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm outside project
3.4sfilesystemwrote ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/12.21.0/pnpm-native.c61f60b072e6.tgz · ~/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/12.21.0/pnpm-native.c61f60b072e6.tmp
3.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
3.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
3.4sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/pnpm
3.4sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-sgGZVk/scripts/home/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/12.21.0/pnpm-native
3.4sprocessexited 1: ✗ Fix missing prerequisites before continuing
3.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
3.5snetworkCONNECT tcp://repo.anaconda.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/ls
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/tail
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/sort
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
3.5sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
3.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
19sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
19sprocess8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
19sprocessscript backend runs setup only
19sprocessscript backend runs setup only
19sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install_deps.sh:261 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/install_deps.sh:178 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:721 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `✗ API→Gateway: connection refused` | Gateway URL mismatch | Check `.env` `GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:15888` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verify_build.sh:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor _p in "$API_DIR/.env" "$HOME/.hummingbot/.env" ".env"; doFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_integration.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env file (first match wins)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/install_deps.sh:178 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/test_integration.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verify_build.sh:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ─── 5. Dev .env validation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install_all.sh:160 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > "$API_DIR/.env" << EOFFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_integration.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.path.expanduser("~/.hummingbot/.env"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_integration.py:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdetail = "API running but Gateway unreachable — check GATEWAY_URL in .env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_deps.sh:262 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo usermod -aG docker "$USER" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/install_deps.sh:65 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationSKILL.md:665 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime**What hot-reload means:** Changes to `*.py` files in hummingbot-api are applied immediately. Changes to hummingbot source (editable install) are also picked up on reload.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_integration.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"hummingbot-api/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install_all.sh:157 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Always write the dev .env so DATABASE_URL and BROKER_HOST point to localhost.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_integration.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verify_build.sh:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install_all.sh:178 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesok "Dev .env written (postgres + EMQX + gateway all on localhost)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install_deps.sh:261 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install_all.sh:156 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesstep "Write dev .env (localhost URLs — fixes Docker-internal hostnames)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/install_deps.sh:178 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,898 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

39 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/work/.corepack.env, ~/.corepack.env.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fengtality: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  5. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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