Skills/ClawHub/hummingbot-deploy

hummingbot-deploy@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Deploy Hummingbot trading infrastructure including API server, MCP server, and Condor Telegram bot. Use this skill when the user wants to install, deploy, se..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher fengtality · publishing for 264 daysInstalls 1,291Last detonated 54 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env manually (skip interactive setup)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:106 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebash <(curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hummingbot/skills/main/skills/hummingbot-deploy/scripts/install_mcp.sh) \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:35 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebash <(curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hummingbot/skills/main/skills/hummingbot-deploy/scripts/check_env.sh)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:144 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebash <(curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hummingbot/skills/main/skills/hummingbot-deploy/scripts/verify.sh)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:112 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebash <(curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/hummingbot/skills/main/skills/hummingbot-deploy/scripts/install_mcp.sh) \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:64 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges[ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] && ! command -v sudo &>/dev/null && echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nwhile [[ "$1" == *=* ]]; do export "$1"; shift; done\nexec "$@"' > /usr/local/bin/sudo && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:62 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Set USER env var and create sudo shim if neededFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:123 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx skills add hummingbot/skillsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verify.sh:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:64 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions[ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] && ! command -v sudo &>/dev/null && echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nwhile [[ "$1" == *=* ]]; do export "$1"; shift; done\nexec "$@"' > /usr/local/bin/sudo && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/sudoFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat > .env << EOFFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/verify.sh:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor f in hummingbot-api/.env ~/.hummingbot/.env .env; doFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,360 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fengtality: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim fengtalityPropose a patch to the maintainer