Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-voucher-list

huawei-cloud-voucher-list@1.0.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. List Huawei Cloud BSS (费用中心) vouchers / coupons of a tenant account through KooCLI (hcloud BSS ListSubCustomerCoupons — read-only GET /v2/promotions/benefits/coupons), with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdkbss v2 SDK when hcloud is not installed. 2. Three output modes: full-field table (default, every returned field including 券ID/券码/状态/类型/面额/余额/有效期/促销计划), --json (raw response array), and --names-only (compact voucher / plan-name list). 3. Supports --status / --name / --coupon-id filtering, region override, and automatic offset paging. --coupon-id and --status are real coupon-list query parameters (status accepts 1-5 or textual aliases such as available / used / expired / reclaimed); --name is applied client-side because the API has no name parameter. 4. Explicit error hints for an empty voucher list (「当前区域无 BSS 代金券」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission (「无权限访问 BSS 代金券，请检查 IAM 权限」), missing or invalid AK/SK credentials, and hcloud not installed. 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / update / reclaim / transfer / retrieve / adjust / send / freeze / cancel) or any operation other than the read-only coupon list is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 6. Triggers include: "代金券盘点", "代金券列表", "查询代金券", "优惠券列表", "费用管理", "list BSS coupons", "list vouchers", "coupon inventory", "voucher list", "华为云代金券", "billing voucher query". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover output modes, filters, paging, error scenarios, SDK fallback, and the write-intent guard." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 5 days agoInstalls 131Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_voucher.py:281 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

No other findings across 1,874 lines in 9 files.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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