Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-sfs-list

huawei-cloud-sfs-list@1.0.11

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "1. List Huawei Cloud SFS (Scalable File Service) file systems in a tenant region through KooCLI (`hcloud SFSTurbo ListShares` — read-only), with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdksfsturbo v1 SDK (SFSTurboClient.list_shares) when hcloud is not installed. 2. Output modes: full-field aligned table (default, every returned field including 名称/ID/状态/协议/容量/可用区/类型/企业项目), --json (raw response array), --names-only (compact file-system name + ID inventory) and --count-only (just the number of matching file systems). 3. Supports --region (default cn-north-4), --page-size with automatic limit/offset paging, and client-side --name / --id / --status / --share-proto / --az filtering (the SFS ListShares request itself only accepts limit/offset). 4. Explicit error hints for empty file-system lists (「当前区域无 SFS 文件 系统」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission (「无权限访问 SFS,请检查 IAM 权限」), missing or invalid AK/SK credentials, hcloud not installed, and KooCLI usage errors. 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / expand / shrink / resize / mount / unmount / attach / detach / restore / reboot ...) or any operation other than the read-only ListShares is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 6. Triggers include: "list SFS file systems", "SFS file system list", "SFS 文件系统列表", "查询SFS文件系统", "查询文件系统列表", "SFS Turbo 列表", "文件存储列表", "SFS inventory", "list file systems", "华为云SFS列表". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover output modes, filters, paging, error scenarios, SDK fallback and the write-intent guard." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 14 days agoInstalls 177Last detonated 2 h ago
$clawhub install huawei-cloud-sfs-list
WatchReport an issue

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_sfs.py:298 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

No other findings across 1,982 lines in 10 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,328 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.