Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-rds-export-markdown

huawei-cloud-rds-export-markdown@1.0.9

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. Query the Huawei Cloud RDS (Relational Database Service) instance list of a tenant region through KooCLI (`hcloud RDS ListInstances`, the official read-only GET /v3/{project_id}/instances), with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdkrds v3 SDK (`RdsClient.list_instances`) when hcloud is not installed. 2. Export the instance name list (plus ID / status / engine / version / flavor / private IP / availability zone / created time) into a well-formed local Markdown table file — strictly local file generation, nothing is ever written back to the cloud. `--output` sets the file path (default `rds_instances.md` in the current directory); the parent directory is created automatically and the file is written via a temp file + atomic rename. 3. Region aware: `--region` (default cn-north-4); `--project_id` is mapped to the KooCLI global `--cli-project-id`. Optional `--name` server-side filter and `--status` client-side filter (the real ListInstances API has no status parameter, so the full list is fetched first and filtered locally). 4. Explicit error classification: empty instance list (still writes the file), missing AK/SK credentials (「缺少 AK/SK 凭证」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission (「无权限访问 RDS，请检查 IAM 权限」), hcloud not installed (falls back to the SDK, else a clear hint), KooCLI usage errors, and generic API/network failures. 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / update / resize / restart / stop / restore ...) or any operation other than the read-only ListInstances is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 6. Triggers include: "查询RDS生成md文件", "导出RDS实例清单为md", "RDS 实例名称 Markdown", "RDS list markdown", "RDS inventory markdown", "华为云RDS导出 markdown", "export RDS instances to markdown". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover the guard, paging, filters, Markdown rendering, atomic file writing, error classification, SDK fallback and all output modes." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 14 days agoInstalls 2Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_rds_export_markdown.py:271 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ensure_env.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:96 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,411 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim wlc-dev