huawei-cloud-publish-work-to-gallery@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Publish user's work to the Huawei Cloud University Operations Platform (华为云高校运营平台/作品陈列馆). Use this skill whenever the user wants to publish, submit, or upload a project/work to the gallery or an activity (活动) on the platform — including casual phrasings like "把作品发布上去", "投稿到陈列馆", "传作品到平台", "提交作品/项目", "报名发布作品", as well as formal ones like "publish to work gallery", "submit to an activity", "upload work to the platform". Do NOT use for general dev questions, git push to GitCode alone, or platform browsing without publishing intent. Triggers include: "把作品发布上去", "投稿到陈列馆", "传作品到平台", "提交作品/项目", "报名发布作品", "publish to work gallery", "submit to an activity", "upload work to the platform"" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Destructive file system command detected; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
// readFileSync utf8 会把它带进字符串 → JSON.parse 报 "Unexpected token "（Windows 常见）。Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.echo " 还原：rm -rf /etc/yum.repos.d && mv /etc/yum.repos.d.bak /etc/yum.repos.d" ) 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// `https://oauth2:[email protected]/<ns>/<repo>.git`）。若不经剥离就随发布把自己打进作品陈列馆，token 会泄露。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// 二次剥离（幂等，防止形如 https://a:b:c@ 的残留）Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…t.ps1` 需 `powershell` 前缀**）；若安装器未恢复可执行位（Linux 直接调用报 `Permission denied`），先执行一次 `chmod +x "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/"*` 自愈，不改脚本；参数一律用可解析的示例值（无 `<…>` 占位符，避免命令提取器剥离后缺参/空值）。**W…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$p" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$HEARTBEAT_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -KILL "$p" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# 下载正常结束 → 看护 kill -0 失败自然退出，绝不误伤成功路径（不依赖 ps，跨平台）；Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([sys.executable, path], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod 0755 "$_target" 2>/dev/null || { rm -f "$_target" 2>/dev/null; continue; }Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dev-skills-operator: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.