Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-iam-diagnose

huawei-cloud-iam-diagnose@1.0.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Invoke this skill to check whether a Huawei Cloud IAM user likely has permission to perform an action/resource — 华为云 IAM 参考性权限分析/诊断. Given a user name and a target action (e.g. ecs:servers:list) / resource, it expands the user's permission chains (direct attached policies + user-group inheritance + agencies), parses policy document Allow/Deny statements and outputs a "大概率有权限/无权限" reference verdict with a confidence grade and full chain trace. Group/agency permissions are cross-validated with the real IAM check interfaces. Read-only, R3 auto-execute. Honest boundary: no user-level policy-simulation API exists on Huawei Cloud, so results are reference-only, never an authoritative auth decision; custom policy + Condition + agency-stacking are flagged "仅供参考". Triggers include: 权限分析, 权限诊断, 权限评估, 是否有权限, 查权限, IAM 权限, 权限链路, 谁能访问, 参考性权限分析, 权限检查, permission diagnosis, permission analysis, check permission, IAM permission, permission chain, has permission, policy analysis, who has access, role permission, access denied 排查, unauthorized 排查." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher huaweicloudskill · joined 12 days agoInstalls 336Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:196 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:195 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/config.py:100 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:30 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ensure_env.py:146 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/check_env.sh:72 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:198 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:197 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/check_env.sh:71 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:40 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ensure_env.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim huaweicloudskill: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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