Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-dms-list

huawei-cloud-dms-list@1.0.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. List Huawei Cloud DMS (Distributed Message Service) instances in a tenant region through KooCLI — Kafka via `hcloud Kafka ListInstances` and RabbitMQ via `hcloud RabbitMQ ListInstancesDetails` (both read-only GET /v2/{project_id}/instances) — with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdkkafka / huaweicloudsdkrabbitmq v2 SDKs when hcloud is not installed. 2. Default output is the compact instance-name list (名称列表, also available via --names-only); --table renders the full-field table (实例ID/名称/引擎/版本/规格/状态/节点数/存储空间/创建时间/VPC/子网/连接地址, missing values shown as "-"), and --json outputs the raw instance array. 3. Supports --engine kafka|rabbitmq|all (default all, both engines), region / project override, --limit / --offset paging with automatic page fetching, and the real server-side filters --name / --name-equal / --instance-id / --status / --enterprise-project-id. 4. Explicit error hints for empty instance lists (「当前区域（x）无 DMS 实例」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission, missing or invalid AK/SK credentials, missing project_id on the SDK fallback, missing hcloud, and KooCLI [USE_ERROR] usage failures (all non-zero exit). 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / resize / restart / flush / clear / restore / backup / freeze / migrate) or any operation other than the two read-only list operations is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only, every request is a GET. 6. Triggers include: "list DMS instances", "DMS instance list", "查询 DMS 实例 列表", "DMS 实例列表", "Kafka 实例列表", "RabbitMQ 实例列表", "消息实例列表", "DMS inventory", "list kafka instances", "华为云 DMS 列表". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess + fake SDK clients) cover the output modes, filters, paging, error scenarios, SDK fallback and the write-intent guard." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 14 days agoInstalls 4Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_dms.py:264 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:96 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,315 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim wlc-dev