Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-computing-query

huawei-cloud-computing-query@1.0.6

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Queries Huawei Cloud computing resources (ECS/BMS/IMS/AS/CCE), Covers ECS instances, flavors, keypairs, quotas, server groups, block devices, NICs, VNC console, BMS bare metal servers/flavors/quotas, IMS images/OS versions/members/quotas, AS scaling groups/configs/policies/activity logs/lifecycle hooks/warm pools/quotas, and CCE clusters/nodes/node pool details/node pool tags/cluster tags/quotas (read-only). No write operations. Cross-category: for cloud disks (EVS) use huawei-cloud-storage-query; for ECS create/start/stop/reboot/delete/resize use huawei-cloud-ecs-manage; for CCE workloads/namespaces/events use the container/cce kubectl-based skills. Use this skill when the user needs to query ECS instance details, list flavors, check BMS availability, browse images, view auto-scaling group/policy status, or inventory CCE clusters and nodes. Triggers: 弹性云服务器, ECS, 裸金属, BMS, 镜像, IMS, 弹性伸缩, AS, 伸缩组, 伸缩策略, 规格查询, CCE, 云容器引擎, 集群, 节点, 节点池, flavor, instance, image, scaling, cluster, node." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher huaweicloudskill · publishing for 54 daysInstalls 449Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/config.py:62 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking- http://user:pass@host:portFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:314 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" CentOS : sudo yum install -y python3 python3-pip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:313 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Ubuntu : sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3 python3-pip python3-venv")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Coercive compliance languageSKILL.md:119 · Coercive compliance language11. You must execute `-h` to view usage before executing each scriptFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/check_env.sh:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu : sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3 python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/ensure_env.py:315 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Fedora : sudo dnf install -y python3 python3-pip")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Coercive compliance languageSKILL.md:148 · Coercive compliance language**When this skill is invoked, you must follow these steps; do not wait for the user to prompt again:**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ensure_env.py:264 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/check_env.sh:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " CentOS : sudo yum install -y python3"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,087 tok
1 file · 119 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim huaweicloudskill: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim huaweicloudskillPropose a patch to the maintainer