huawei-cloud-cloudrobo-r2c@1.0.2
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Run the R2C (Robot-to-Cloud) data-plane client — start the robot-side edge client (Zenoh pub/sub with mTLS credential bundle, hardware adapter, translator, control loop). The credential bundle is produced by the robot skill's export-certificate command. This skill does NOT cover robot registration or certificate export (use the robot skill). Triggers include: r2c client, robot edge client, Zenoh, mTLS, credential bundle, hardware adapter, robot config, dry_run, observation recording, custom adapter, robot-to-cloud, R2C客户端, 硬件适配器, 机器人配置, 凭证包." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
No other findings across 2,682 lines in 12 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim huaweicloudskill: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.