huawei-cloud-cdn-export-domains@1.0.5
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "1. Query the Huawei Cloud CDN (Content Delivery Network) accelerated-domain list of a tenant through KooCLI (`hcloud CDN ListDomains --cli-region=<region>`; the official read-only GET /v1.0/cdn/domains), with an automatic fallback to the official huaweicloudsdkcdn v1 SDK (CdnClient.list_domains) when hcloud is not installed. 2. Export/download the accelerated-domain list into a local file. Four output modes: `--format csv` (default, machine-readable), `markdown`/`md` (GitHub-flavored table with a **域名** column first), `json` (array of raw records) and `table` (stdout only). `--output`/`-o` sets the path (default `cdn_domains_<region>_<timestamp>.<ext>`); the parent directory is created automatically and the file is written via a temp file + atomic rename. Strictly local file generation — nothing is ever written back to the cloud. 3. Supports `--domain-name` / `--domain-status` / `--business-type` / `--service-area` / `--enterprise-project-id` / `--exact-match` / `--show-tags` filtering (all real server-side ListDomains query parameters), `--region` override and automatic `page_number` paging over the response `total` count. 4. Explicit error hints for empty domain lists (「当前区域无 CDN 加速域名」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission (「无权限访问内容分发网络(CDN)」), missing or invalid AK/SK credentials, hcloud not installed, and bad export paths. 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / update / modify / enable / disable / refresh / preheat) or any operation other than ListDomains is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 6. Triggers include: "下载CDN列表", "导出CDN加速域名", "CDN域名盘点导出", "导出/下载华为云 CDN 加速域名列表", "export cdn domains", "download cdn domain list", "CDN 加速域名导出", "cdn list export". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover output modes, filters, page_number paging, error scenarios, the SDK fallback, the export formats and the write-intent guard." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.