Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-cdm-list

huawei-cloud-cdm-list@1.0.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. Query the Huawei Cloud CDM (Cloud Data Migration) clusters of the current account through KooCLI (`hcloud CDM ListClusters --cli-region=<region>`; official read-only GET /v1.1/{project_id}/clusters), with an automatic fallback to the huaweicloudsdkcdm v1 SDK (CdmClient) when KooCLI is absent. 2. Two read-only views: the project-wide cluster list (default, ListClusters) and single-cluster details incl. instance status (ShowClusterDetail, GET /v1.1/{project_id}/clusters/{cluster_id}) via --cluster-id. 3. Four output modes: aligned key-field table (default: id / name / status / status_detail / status_meaning / version / instance_count / instances / flavor_name / az_name / public_endpoint / is_frozen / created / updated), `--json` (raw API records), `--markdown` (GitHub-flavored table) and `--csv`; `--output` writes a file via a temp file + atomic rename. 4. Filters: `--name` (case-insensitive substring) and repeatable `--status` (status code 100/200/300/303/500/800/900/910/920 or Chinese meaning such as 正常/失败/冻结), both applied client-side — the official ListClusters API takes no query parameters at all (verified against ListClustersRequest.attribute_map being empty), so one call returns the whole list. 5. Explicit error hints for empty cluster lists, 403 / missing `cdm:cluster:list` permission, missing AK/SK credentials, a missing KooCLI backend, and bad export paths. 6. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / update / restart / resize / start / stop / expand ...) or any operation outside the two read-only ones is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 7. Triggers include: "CDM 集群列表", "查询云数据迁移集群", "CDM 集群巡检", "cdm list clusters", "CDM cluster status", "迁移前集群盘点", "CDM 集群详情", "华为云 CDM 集群"." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 14 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ensure_env.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:96 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_cdm_clusters.py:447 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,348 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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