Skills/ClawHub/huawei-cloud-cci-list

huawei-cloud-cci-list@1.0.5

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "1. List Huawei Cloud Cloud Container Instance (CCI) resources in a tenant region through KooCLI (hcloud CCI List* — read-only Kubernetes-style GET operations): namespaces (ListCoreV1Namespace, GET /api/v1/namespaces), pods / instances (ListCoreV1PodForAllNamespaces, GET /api/v1/pods; ListCoreV1NamespacedPod, GET /api/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/pods) and workloads (ListAppsV1DeploymentForAllNamespaces, GET /apis/apps/v1/deployments; ListAppsV1NamespacedDeployment, GET /apis/apps/v1/namespaces/{namespace}/deployments). 2. Three output modes: key-field table (default, 名称/命名空间/状态/副本/创建时间 等关键字段), --json (raw Kubernetes objects) and --names-only (compact namespace/name inventory). 3. Supports --resource namespace|pod|deployment, --namespace scoping, --name (client-side substring), --label-selector / --field-selector (real Kubernetes server-side query parameters), a region override and automatic continue-token paging. 4. Explicit error hints for empty resource lists (「当前区域无 CCI 资源」), 403 / insufficient IAM permission (「无权限访问云容器实例（CCI）」), missing or invalid AK/SK credentials, and hcloud not installed. 5. Built-in write-intent guard: any mutating intent (create / delete / patch / replace / apply / scale / restart / pod exec / ...) or any operation other than the five read-only List operations is rejected before execution — this skill is strictly read-only. 6. Triggers include: "list CCI namespaces", "CCI 命名空间列表", "CCI Pod 列表", "CCI 实例列表", "query CCI resources", "CCI 日常巡检", "CCI 盘点", "list cci pods", "cloud container instance inventory", "华为云CCI列表". 7. Offline unit tests (mocked hcloud subprocess) cover routing, output modes, filters, paging, error scenarios and the write-intent guard." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wlc-dev · joined 14 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:80 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_cli.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/list_cci.py:329 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/ensure_cli.sh:96 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,742 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wlc-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim wlc-dev