hipool@1.0.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "嵌入式纯 C 记忆系统,支持多线程、Fork 快照、分片管理,提供高效键值存储与基于标签、时间的范围查询。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; Destructive file system command detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system(f"rm -rf {env_path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["redis-server", "--daemonize", "yes"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.rm -f /tmp/hipool_mtFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system(f"rm -f {db_path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system(f"rm -rf {env_path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /tmp/hipool_mtFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system(f"rm -f {db_path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(["redis-cli", "ping"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hualang-c: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.