Skills/ClawHub/highlevel-90d-social-media-generator

highlevel-90d-social-media-generator@1.0.7

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Generate a 90-day social media calendar in High Level CRM, 1 post ever 2 days. (HL Social Planner CSV): pulls the client's sitemap for using link-back URLs and post topics, AI writes posts + images per post, with or without HighLevel connection. Requires HighLevel to import data but optional, will ask for details if needed. Requires AI model for content, image API + SSH/FTP host for image uploads." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher eddieflux · publishing for 83 daysInstalls 569Last detonated 6 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/generate_images.py:300 · References a credential file in the home directorykey = args.ssh_key or os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/generate_images.py:215 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["scp"] + conn + [local, dest], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate_posts.py:143 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesposts_path = out_path.replace(".csv", "-posts.json")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# MODE A - HighLevel connected (needs HIGHLEVEL_ACCESS_TOKEN in .env or env):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/common.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- A local .env file in the repo root is read if present (gitignored).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/common.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv = os.path.join(REPO_ROOT, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_images.py:300 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileskey = args.ssh_key or os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈910 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim eddieflux: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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