Skills/ClawHub/hekouwang-claude-skill-doctor-skill

hekouwang-claude-skill-doctor-skill@1.8.6

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "体检 Agent Skill：默认 check.py 评 SKILL.md 触发/篇幅/渐进披露/可移植/安全；可选套件可检查项目说明文档与本机开发环境；可选 SkillSpector 深度扫描与 trigger_eval（会把 query/description 发给外部模型）；给评分卡并可代重构" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher huiyonghkw · publishing for 94 daysInstalls 1,858Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test-frontmatter.sh:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprintf 'api_key="%s%s"\n' "$fake_prefix" "$fake_suffix" > "$TMP/nested/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/trigger_eval.py:169 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…put Injection` 95% + `AST4`（它建议的 remediation 恰恰就是这个写法）；docstring 里写"本脚本**绝不读取** .env/*.key" → `PE3 Credential Access`；字体文件名列表 → `MP2 Context Window Stuffing`；中文 fro…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:209 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **拔密钥（最高优先）**：#0 命中时把明文移出 SKILL.md / 捆绑文件，改放 `.env` / 密钥管理器；命中即视为已泄露，提醒轮换并查 git 历史（skill 很可能已 push 到 GitHub）。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscheck.py:133 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(?i)(x{3,}|y{3,}|your[_\-]?|<[^>]*>|\$\{|\benv\b|process\.env|os\.environ|"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedSKILL.md:108 · Python subprocess execution detected…度误报样本**（别被 90%+ 唬住，这些全部核实为假）：`rm -f "$写死的路径"` → `TM1 Tool Parameter Abuse` 95%；`subprocess.run([...], check=True)` 硬编码列表 → `OH1 Unvalidated Output Injection` 95% + `AST4`（它建议的…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:201 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **绝不读取密钥文件**：`.env` / `*.key` / `*.pem` / `*secret*` 一律不打开（脚本本身也不读）。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscheck.py:536 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesbase == ".env" or base.startswith(".env.") orFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,335 tok
3 files · 19 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim huiyonghkw: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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