healthai@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "提供体检报告分析、健康风险评估、个性化运动方案及每日打卡提醒,支持文字和图片OCR输入。" Observed in sandbox: sends data to open.feishu.cn.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 18 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); OS command execution function call detected. Summary: sends data to open.feishu.cn.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(f"echo '{new_cron}' | crontab -", shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cron_list = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null").read()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.os.system(f'"{script_path}"')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(f"echo '{new_cron}' | crontab -", shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cron_list = os.popen("crontab -l 2>/dev/null").read()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.current_cron = subprocess.check_output("crontab -l 2>/dev/null", shell=True).decode("utf-8")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.current_cron = subprocess.check_output("crontab -l 2>/dev/null", shell=True).decode("utf-8")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.μmolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim amitabhama: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.