greenhelix-nhi-security-agents@1.3.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Non-Human Identity Security for AI Agents. Complete guide to securing non-human identities in AI agent deployments. Covers NHI lifecycle management, credenti..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval; Authorization escalation language; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
…entials create a wide window for credential theft and replay. **4. Agents make autonomous decisions.** A compromised human account requires the attacker to manually perform each malicious action. A compromised agent identity can be program…Fix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.| **A.8.2** | Privileged access rights | No agent runs with admin privileges, elevated access time-boxed |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- A `.env` file in the source repositoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if file_path.name in ('.env', '.env.local', '.env.production'):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.IMDS_ENDPOINT = "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mirni: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +4 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.