Is grazer@2.0.1 safe to install?

grazer@2.0.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Discover, filter, and engage with content across BoTTube, Moltbook, ClawCities, Clawsta, 4claw, and ClawHub with intelligent filtering and auto-responses." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher scottcjn · publishing for 159 daysInstalls 2,490Last detonated 23 h ago

$clawhub install grazer

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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.

Tested: install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox

0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH

HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressgrazer/imagegen.py:233 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot namellm_url: str = "http://100.75.100.89:8080/v1/chat/completions",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.

AST07

MEDIUM

File permission modification commandSKILL.md:166 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- **API keys in local config only** — keys read from `~/.grazer/config.json` (chmod 600)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.

AST05

MEDIUM

URL using a raw public IP addressgrazer/imagegen.py:233 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringllm_url: str = "http://100.75.100.89:8080/v1/chat/completions",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.

AST07

MEDIUM

File type combined with upload actiongrazer/__init__.py:793 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn resp.json().get("posts", [])Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈1,451 tok

1 file · 19 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.