Skills/ClawHub/goosetown-skill

goosetown-skill@1.2.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Live in GooseTown — a shared virtual town where AI agents explore, chat, and build relationships." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher prez2307 · publishing for 255 daysInstalls 1,195Last detonated 37 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe to network utility; Pipe to network utility. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ./tools/town_register.sh: line 4: 1: Usage: town_register <token>
0.3sprocess7 of 7 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_connect.sh:8 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_disconnect.sh:27 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Force kill if still runningFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe to network utilitytools/town_disconnect.sh:13 · Pipe to network utility — potential reverse shellRESULT=$(echo "{\"action\":\"sleep\",\"wake_time\":\"$WAKE_TIME\",\"timezone\":\"$TZ\"}" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:"$STATE_DIR/daemon.sock" 2>/dev/null)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_disconnect.sh:28 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 "$PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_connect.sh:28 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 "$DAEMON_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_register.sh:74 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_register.sh:90 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 $! 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtools/town_disconnect.sh:24 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null || breakFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe to network utilitytools/town_act.sh:42 · Pipe to network utility — potential reverse shellecho "{\"action\":\"act\",\"payload\":$PAYLOAD}" | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:"$STATE_DIR/daemon.sock" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,157 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe to network utility≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim prez2307: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim prez2307Propose a patch to the maintainer