Skills/ClawHub/google-health-cli-scan-pr23b

google-health-cli-scan-pr23b@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Read your Google Health data from any agent. Lists data points for every Google Health data type (heart rate, resting heart rate, sleep, steps, distance, weight, blood oxygen, VO2 max, exercise, and more), returns server-side daily roll-ups (one reconciled total per day), gives a parsed view of exercise sessions, and can GET any read-only v4 API path. A self-contained, read-only client for the Google Health v4 API: authenticates via OAuth2 (token cached locally and auto-refreshed) and emits JSON. `data list`, `rollup daily`, `sessions --raw` and `api get` return every record the API sends for the time window you ask for (applied server-side), with no filtering or merging; the `sessions` parsed view leaves out points it can't date and reports how many on stderr. It never writes to Google Health; the only file it writes is its own local OAuth token cache. The caller decides what to do with the data. Also ships the setup and housekeeping commands a CLI needs: auth login/logout/status, doctor (local setup diagnostics), config show/path, version, and shell completion. Single static binary, no Python or other runtime. NOTE: needs your own Google Cloud OAuth client and a one-time interactive browser login; runs headless afterward." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher stozo04 · publishing for 131 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 18 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:147 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions> it never creates `config.json`, so restrict that file yourself (`chmod 600 config.json`).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:241 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files> `config.json` picked up from the working directory can't send your OAuth token elsewhere orFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,237 tok
1 file · 41 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim stozo04: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim stozo04Propose a patch to the maintainer