Skills/ClawHub/good-memory

good-memory@2.0.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Session 历史记录恢复技能。Session重置后自动恢复对话上下文，解决系统自动重置导致的"失忆"问题。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher acilgit · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 1,115Last detonated 22 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.0sprocessexited 1: mkdir: cannot create directory '/root': Permission denied
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexited 1: chmod: cannot access '/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/good-memory/scripts/*.sh': Permission denied
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexited 1: mkdir: cannot create directory '/root': Permission denied
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexited 1: chmod: cannot access '/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/good-memory/scripts/*.sh': Permission denied

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:4 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# 用法：curl -sSL https://xxx/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:21 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/"*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:4 · Remote installer piped to shell# 用法：curl -sSL https://xxx/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:32 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -sSL https://wry-manatee-359.convex.site/api/v1/download?slug=good-memory | bash -s installFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/autorecover.py:135 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/"*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:32 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -sSL https://wry-manatee-359.convex.site/api/v1/download?slug=good-memory | bash -s installFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/autorecover.py:182 · Python subprocess execution detectedhistory_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈594 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim acilgit: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim acilgitPropose a patch to the maintainer