golive@0.1.0-alpha.9
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Take an agent-written app from repo to live production on the user's OWN accounts, with providers they choose (hosting, database, auth, payments, email, domain/DNS). The human connects accounts and approves changes; supported wiring operations run through a local CLI and produce verification evidence with explicit limits. Use when the user wants to ship, deploy, go live, launch, publish, or put their app online, or asks to wire up env vars, webhooks, auth settings (signup, email confirmation, password policy), a real signup → confirmation email → login journey, password recovery, account isolation between two users, auth redirects, email DNS or a custom domain." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Refusal suppression; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mikehasa: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.