Skills/ClawHub/gmail-skill

gmail-skill@1.2.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Gmail automation: summarize, labels, spam purge, filing, deletion, permanent delete" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher r39132 · publishing for 279 daysInstalls 2,290Last detonated 17 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Coercive compliance language; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandbins/gmail-background-task.sh:121 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 $TASK_PID 2>/dev/null && [[ $ELAPSED -ge $UPDATE_INTERVAL ]]; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbins/gmail-background-task.sh:117 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswhile kill -0 $TASK_PID 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Coercive compliance languageSKILL.md:19 · Coercive compliance language2. **ALWAYS run the script.** Every capability below has a specific command. You MUST execute it. Do NOT skip execution based on assumptions or prior results.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbins/gmail-bg-status.sh:76 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:177 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**`gmail-bg`** — Shortcut for `gmail-background-task.sh` that auto-sources `.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,931 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim r39132: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim r39132Propose a patch to the maintainer