gmail-connect@1.0.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Connect OpenClaw to Gmail on Ubuntu with a local OAuth wizard. Search and read mail, check for new messages, and optionally send reviewed drafts." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:29 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_core.py:35 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Privileged sudo commandassets/ui/index.html:12 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/gmail_connect/server.py:22 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionassets/ui/index.html:11 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/gmail_connect/server.py:22 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gmail_connect/service.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gmail_connect/service.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gmail_connect.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gmail_connect/service.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_core.py:162 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_core.py:161 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_core.py:23 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_core.py:162 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_core.py:35 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_ui.cjs:17 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim svetlyoh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim svetlyoh