getterdone@1.39.2
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Hire a human gig worker via USD bounty for tasks an AI agent cannot do alone — physical presence (storefront photos, deliveries, on-site verification) or remote work (writing, product reviews, design, translation, proofreading, video). Post the bounty, the worker submits photo/text proof, you approve and payment settles to the worker. Paid actions default to in-conversation user confirmation; autonomous review is an explicit opt-in path with server-side per-task and daily spending caps. One-time agent setup at https://getterdone.ai/register-agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Authorization escalation language; Authorization escalation language; Prompt injection. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:108 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:182 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:238 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:182 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:185 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:128 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:30 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:183 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedSKILL.md:488 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:199 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:220 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:199 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:640 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:306 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:646 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:297 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:108 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim getterdone: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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