Skills/ClawHub/funky-fund-flamingo

funky-fund-flamingo@1.0.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Self-evolution that makes fuck tons of cash — repair-first, value-focused, dolla dolla bill y'all" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher icemastert · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 2,069Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/.write-probe-1115-1795026354027
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/git
0.5sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/git
0.5sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/git
0.5sprocessexec /pnpm/git
0.5sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/git
0.5sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/git
0.5sprocessexec /usr/sbin/git
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.5sprocessexited 1: fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sfilesystemwrote ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/.write-probe-1171-1795026354486 · ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/evolution_state.json · ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/skills_list_cache.json.tmp-1171-1795026354490 · ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/funky_fund_flamingo_persistent_memory.json.tmp-1171-1795026354492
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sprocess8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsevolve.js:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsevolve.js:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load env from workspace root: ../../.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiongenerate_history.js:170 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`• Output file: ${OUT_FILE}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionanalyze_by_skill.js:224 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`• Output: ${OUT_FILE}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract_log.js:196 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`• Output file: ${OUT_FILE}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:25 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesUse this skill when you're ready to **get paid**. We inspect reality, kill breakage and value leaks, and run mutation cycles that produce **concrete gains** — so the stack earns, not just runs.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Optional environment overrides from `../../.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,807 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim icemastert: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim icemastertPropose a patch to the maintainer