fuku-predictions@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Trade Kalshi prediction markets through conversation, powered by Fuku sports model predictions. Use when a user asks about Kalshi markets, wants sports predi..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Load .env from skill root (one level up from scripts/)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Check if kill switch file exists."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.print("❌ Kalshi not configured. Set KALSHI_API_KEY_ID and KALSHI_PRIVATE_KEY in .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print("❌ Kalshi not configured. Add API key to .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Check kill switchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.load_dotenv(os.path.join(_dir, "..", ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Import here to ensure .env is loadedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self.env_path = os.path.join(self.skill_dir, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print("✅ Credentials saved to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(["crontab", "-"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Check if kill switch is activated."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._env_path = os.path.join(_script_dir, "..", ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Create `.env` in the skill directory:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cryptopunk2070: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.