Skills/ClawHub/fox-veille

fox-veille@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "RSS feed aggregator, deduplication engine, LLM scoring, and output dispatcher for OpenClaw agents. Use when: fetching recent articles from configured sources..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher qinthqod · publishing for 230 daysInstalls 820Last detonated 15 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Telegram Bot API URL; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLscripts/dispatch.py:518 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramf"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/scorer.py:72 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"- recommend chmod 600", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:321 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.ssh`, `.gnupg`, `.config/systemd`, `crontab`, `/etc/`, `.bashrc`, `.profile`, `.bash_profile`, `.zshrc`, `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/scorer.py:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionspermissions (world-readable). Recommended: chmod 600.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:101 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `~/.openclaw/config/veille/config.json` | `setup.py` | Sources, outputs, options | NO |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:123 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `telegram_bot` | `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` or `bot_token` in output config | Bot token (read-only) |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/dispatch.py:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:151 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…## Cross-config reads - The only cross-config file read is `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` for the Telegram bot token, and only when `telegram_bot` output is enabled without an explicit `bot_token`. This read is logged to stderr. Set `bot_toke…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:109 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` | `dispatch.py` | `channels.telegram.botToken` (read-only) | Only when `telegram_bot` output is enabled and no `bot_token` is set in the output config |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/dispatch.py:641 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedSKILL.md:143 · Python subprocess execution detected…. ### Subprocess boundaries - Dispatch delegates to other OpenClaw skills via `subprocess.run()` (never `shell=True`). Script paths are validated to reside under `~/.openclaw…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/dispatch.py:557 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,405 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim qinthqod: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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