Skills/ClawHub/founderclaw

founderclaw@2.1.0

BLOCKED· static only

Publisher claims: "FounderClaw — Multi-agent engineering team for OpenClaw. 29 skills, 6 agents (CEO + 5 departments), structured workspace, auto mode, vision sub-agent routing..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ashish797 · publishing for 236 daysInstalls 1,046Last detonated 32 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 39/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicecareful/bin/check-careful.sh:96 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device# docker rm -f / docker system pruneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentcso/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscso/SKILL.md:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesgit log -p --all -S "sk-" --diff-filter=A -- "*.env" "*.yml" "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentplan-ceo-review/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdesign-consultation/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdesign-shotgun/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentautoplan/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscso/SKILL.md:200 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesScan git history for leaked credentials, check tracked `.env` files, find CI configs with inline secrets.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscso/SKILL.md:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesgit log -p --all -S "AKIA" --diff-filter=A -- "*.env" "*.yml" "*.yaml" "*.json" "*.toml" 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocument-release/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcareful/bin/check-careful.sh:54 · Destructive file system command detected# rm -rf / rm -r / rm --recursiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentplan-eng-review/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdesign-consultation/SKILL.md:294 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files- A) Ship it — write DESIGN.md and CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicecareful/bin/check-careful.sh:54 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device# rm -rf / rm -r / rm --recursiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentland-and-deploy/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentship/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesdesign-consultation/SKILL.md:281 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files**Update CLAUDE.md** (or create it if it doesn't exist) — append this section:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentqa-only/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentbenchmark/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentretro/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentplan-design-review/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscso/SKILL.md:172 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesls .env .env.* 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcareful/bin/check-careful.sh:96 · Destructive file system command detected# docker rm -f / docker system pruneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentcanary/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentqa/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdesign-review/SKILL.md:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRegenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/prototype.ts:101 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Output: ${OUTPUT_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/src/commands.ts:29 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesusage: "iterate --session /path/session.json --feedback \"...\" --output /path.png",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/src/compare.ts:627 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ outputPath: options.output, variants: options.images.length }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/prototype.ts:135 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\nOpen in Finder: open ${OUTPUT_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign-review/SKILL.md:123 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesRun full audit, then load previous `design-baseline.json`. Compare: per-category grade deltas, new findings, resolved findings. Output regression table in report.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbrowse/src/cli.ts:531 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// No lock symlink or not readable — nothing to killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbrowse/src/cli.ts:500 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Headed server alive but not responding — kill and restartFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/src/gallery.ts:250 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ outputPath: options.output }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcareful/SKILL.md:19 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- `chmod 777` or overly permissive permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddocument-release/SKILL.md:428 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/founderclaw-pr-body-$$.mdFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcareful/SKILL.md:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- `chown -R` on system directoriesFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesinstall.sh:144 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file# Step 6: Add proactive rules to AGENTS.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbrowse/src/cli.ts:644 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Force kill + cleanupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdocument-release/SKILL.md:219 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime- **Auto-update** — Factual corrections clearly warranted by the diff: adding an item to aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shell# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondesign/prototype.ts:92 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`OK (${elapsed}s) → ${outputPath}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbrowse/src/cli.ts:319 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// This replaces the PID-gated approach which breaks on Windows (Bun's process.killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandbrowse/src/cli.ts:172 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Force kill if still aliveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈81,710 tok
39 files · 165 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

41 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ashish797: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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