founderclaw@2.1.0
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "FounderClaw — Multi-agent engineering team for OpenClaw. 29 skills, 6 agents (CEO + 5 departments), structured workspace, auto mode, vision sub-agent routing..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 39/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
# docker rm -f / docker system pruneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.git log -p --all -S "sk-" --diff-filter=A -- "*.env" "*.yml" "*.json" "*.ts" "*.js" "*.py" 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Scan git history for leaked credentials, check tracked `.env` files, find CI configs with inline secrets.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.git log -p --all -S "AKIA" --diff-filter=A -- "*.env" "*.yml" "*.yaml" "*.json" "*.toml" 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.# rm -rf / rm -r / rm --recursiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- A) Ship it — write DESIGN.md and CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# rm -rf / rm -r / rm --recursiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.**Update CLAUDE.md** (or create it if it doesn't exist) — append this section:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.ls .env .env.* 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# docker rm -f / docker system pruneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Regenerate: bun run gen:skill-docsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.console.log(`Output: ${OUTPUT_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.usage: "iterate --session /path/session.json --feedback \"...\" --output /path.png",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(JSON.stringify({ outputPath: options.output, variants: options.images.length }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`\nOpen in Finder: open ${OUTPUT_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Run full audit, then load previous `design-baseline.json`. Compare: per-category grade deltas, new findings, resolved findings. Output regression table in report.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// No lock symlink or not readable — nothing to killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Headed server alive but not responding — kill and restartFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(JSON.stringify({ outputPath: options.output }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- `chmod 777` or overly permissive permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.rm -f /tmp/founderclaw-pr-body-$$.mdFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- `chown -R` on system directoriesFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# Step 6: Add proactive rules to AGENTS.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Force kill + cleanupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- **Auto-update** — Factual corrections clearly warranted by the diff: adding an item to aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/FounderClaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log(`OK (${elapsed}s) → ${outputPath}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// This replaces the PID-gated approach which breaks on Windows (Bun's process.killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Force kill if still aliveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
41 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ashish797: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.