Skills/ClawHub/fork-latte-skill

fork-latte-skill@1.0.4

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "报名/登记信息收集 agent（中转服务模式）。触发词：「ping」。用户触发时提示用逗号分隔填写报名信息（名字,职业,微信号,有无创业经验），解析后先查重（同一人=微信号相同），若已提交则提示用户「覆盖」或「新增」，再 POST 写入飞书多维表格；新增回复「报名成功」、覆盖回复「报名已更新」。飞书凭证仅存于中转服务端，客户端零敏感信息。需中转服务 endpoint 配置在 relay-server/config.json。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher moljay · publishing for 83 daysInstalls 492Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install fork-latte-skill
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`relay-server/config.json` 存放中转服务地址（与 `relay-server/.env` 同目录）：Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStart-Process -FilePath $np -ArgumentList "--env-file=.env server.js" -WindowStyle Hidden -WorkingDirectory $relayDirFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:99 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files使用**前置步骤**确定的 `endpoint` 与（可选）`api_key`（config.json 优先，否则内置默认值），用 exec 工具发送 POST。Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:47 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesforeach ($d in $dirs) { if ((Test-Path "$d\run-relay.ps1") -and (Test-Path "$d\.env")) { $relayDir = $d; break } }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,455 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.