Skills/ClawHub/follow-up-boss

follow-up-boss@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Command-line tool to manage contacts, tasks, notes, deals, events, and communications via the Follow Up Boss API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher danielfoch · publishing for 280 daysInstalls 2,116Last detonated 40 min ago
$clawhub install follow-up-boss
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Set: export FUB_API_KEY="your_key"
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfub.js:127 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('PUT', `tasks/${args[2]}`, { status: 'Complete' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfub.js:135 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', 'events', JSON.parse(args[2] || '{}')), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfub.js:117 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', 'notes', JSON.parse(args[2] || '{}')), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfub.js:105 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('PUT', `people/${id}`, d), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfub.js:125 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', 'tasks', JSON.parse(args[2] || '{}')), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈690 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.