fletcher-cyber-security-engineer@0.2.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Least-privilege governance, port/egress monitoring, and ISO 27001/NIST compliance for OpenClaw" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 17 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
The script `scripts/install-openclaw-runtime-hook.sh` installs an **opt-in** sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.## Runtime Hook (sudo shim)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Runs the command as `sudo -k -- <command>`, so sudo asks for the password every timeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.9 sudo binary failed validationFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.log "Refusing to install shim: no root-owned sudo found in /usr/bin, /bin or /usr/local/bin."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# The only places sudo is looked for. Not configurable: a caller-supplied path couldFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Whether OpenClaw finds the sudo shim before the real sudo.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# The real sudo is looked for in the system directories only. "command -v sudo"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Every sudo call that would run a command is handed to guarded_privileged_exec.py,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."expected_state": "The gateway reaches sudo only through the approval guard."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Resolves bare command names (`sudo ls`) in the system directories only; sudo options such as `-u` are not supportedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Hook is installed, but OpenClaw does not put ~/.openclaw/bin before the real sudo on its PATH, so it is not used."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Approval guard works, but sudo is not routed through it (runtime hook not installed)."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# sudo shim for OpenClaw, installed as ~/.openclaw/bin/sudo byFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- The sudo binary is one of a fixed list of system paths, never taken from theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- With --use-sudo, the command runs as "sudo -k -- command": sudo ignores any cachedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.for candidate in /usr/bin/sudo /bin/sudo /usr/local/bin/sudo; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Installs the sudo shim (sudo-shim.template.sh) at ~/.openclaw/bin/sudo, then, withFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."expected_state": "sudo and other escalation tools require a password, so they cannot be used unattended."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""True when sudo runs a command without asking for a password (cached credentials ignored)."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Approval guard refuses without a terminal and discards forged session state; sudo is routed through it."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 700 "${OPENCLAW_DIR}" "${BIN_DIR}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- `assessments/port-monitor-latest.json` — latest open-port scan outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# A single flag that asks sudo about itself, or drops cached credentials, runsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# With no arguments sudo only prints its usage.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run([REAL_SUDO, "-n", "-k", "true"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["lsof", "+c", "0", "-nP"] + selector, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- `assessments/egress-monitor-latest.json` — latest outbound connection scan outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.p = subprocess.run(argv, check=False, input=message, text=True, timeout=5, env=safe_env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(exec_argv, env=SAFE_ENV_VARS)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.listing = subprocess.run(["ps", "-axo", "user=,command="], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."chmod 700 ~/.openclaw; chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.1. ``tools.exec.pathPrepend`` in openclaw.json, which OpenClaw puts first on theFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.chmod 700 "${WRAPPER}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.openclaw/service-env/ai.openclaw.gateway.env.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fletcherfrimpong: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.