Skills/ClawHub/fleet-comm

fleet-comm@1.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables real-time text messaging and broadcasting between multiple OpenClaw nodes across machines for coordinated fleet operations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher dagangtj · publishing for 264 daysInstalls 1,476Last detonated 59 min ago
$clawhub install fleet-comm
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 15 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
15sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
15sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessscript backend runs setup only
15sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfleet_cli.js:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', '/send', { from: NODE_ID, to: args[0], msg: args.slice(1).join(' '), type: 'result' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfleet_cli.js:70 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', '/send', { from: NODE_ID, to: args[0], msg: args.slice(1).join(' '), type: 'task' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfleet_cli.js:49 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', '/send', { from: NODE_ID, to: target, msg, type: 'info' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfleet_cli.js:54 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', '/broadcast', { from: NODE_ID, msg: args.join(' '), type: 'info' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfleet_cli.js:42 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await request('POST', '/register', { nodeId: NODE_ID, role: args[0] || 'worker' }), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈495 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.