Skills/ClawHub/file-upload-to-local-workspace

file-upload-to-local-workspace@3.0.1

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "通过网页上传文件到本地workspace,支持智能认证,文件安全保存,供AI分析处理,支持中文名和文件管理。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher chengwang86 · publishing for 256 daysInstalls 1,360Last detonated 26 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js outside project
0.0sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.0sprocessexited 1: cp: cannot create regular file '/tmp/ks-detonate-etOv7N/setup/home/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js': No such file or directory
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec ./install.sh
0.1sprocessexited 126: bash: line 1: ./install.sh: Permission denied
20sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json outside project
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · syscall: 'mkdir', path: '/home/admin/.openclaw/workspace/uploads' } Node.js v22.23.5
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
20sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js outside project
20sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js
20sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
20sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
20sprocessexited 1: cp: cannot create regular file '/tmp/ks-detonate-etOv7N/later/home/.openclaw/workspace/upload-server.js': No such file or directory
20sprocessexec ./install.sh
20sprocessexited 126: bash: line 1: ./install.sh: Permission denied

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteduninstall.sh:17 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /etc/systemd/system/openclaw-upload.serviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:26 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${WORKSPACE}/upload-server.js"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/upload-server.js:446 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`📂 文件目录:${UPLOADS_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:306 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo iptables -L -n | grep 15170Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/upload-server.js:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ 创建上传目录:${UPLOADS_DIR}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,419 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chengwang86: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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