Skills/ClawHub/feishu-skills-kit

feishu-skills-kit@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Complete Feishu (Lark) Skills collection for Claude Code / OpenClaw. Includes 10 skills covering: document management, messaging, spreadsheets, Bitable, inte..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher hewenqiang · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 2,313Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/feishu-card/send.js:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: require('path').resolve(__dirname, '../../.env'), quiet: true });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandskills/feishu-bridge/SKILL.md:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/secrets/feishu_app_secretFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/feishu-memory-recall/SKILL.md:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRequires Feishu credentials in `.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/feishu-memory-recall/index.js:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/test.js:14 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ send.js exists');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send_safe.js:51 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[SafeSend] Cleaned up ${tempFile}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send.js:36 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Uploading image (Hash: ${fileHash.substring(0,8)})...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send.js:265 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Smart Input] Treating --text argument as file path: ${options.text}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send_safe.js:27 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[SafeSend] Written content to ${tempFile}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send.js:236 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Sending Fallback Text to ${receiveId}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send_safe.js:41 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[SafeSend] Executing: ${cmd}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/send.js:180 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Sending card to ${options.target} (Elements: ${elements.length})...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/feishu-card/test.js:19 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ send.js is valid Node.js module');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈7,464 tok
11 files · 45 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hewenqiang: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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