Skills/ClawHub/feishu-evolver-wrapper-ganyu

feishu-evolver-wrapper-ganyu@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Feishu-integrated wrapper for the capability-evolver. Manages the evolution loop lifecycle (start/stop/ensure), sends rich Feishu card reports, and provides..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher foras910521-lab · publishing for 233 daysInstalls 803Last detonated 29 min ago
$clawhub install feishu-evolver-wrapper-ganyu
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 21 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
1.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
1.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
1.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/setsid
1.3sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /pnpm/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /usr/sbin/nohup
1.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/nohup
1.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
1.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
1.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
1.6sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
1.6sprocess8 of 21 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
1.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedindex.js:1429 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadszh: '\u72b6\u6001: [\u6062\u590d] Solidify \u5df2\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u4f46 Hand Agent \u672a\u5199\u5165\u72b6\u6001\u6587\u4ef6\u3002\u7531 wrapper \u81ea\u52a8\u6062\u590d\u3002'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandself-repair.js:51 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Do NOT process.exit here -- this would kill the wrapper daemon.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionexport_history.js:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Uploading Chunk ${i+1}/${chunks.length}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvisualize_dashboard.js:139 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Dashboard] Uploading to Feishu Doc: ${docToken}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandlifecycle.js:454 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Force kill if still runningFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvisualize_dashboard.js:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst ENV_FILE = path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsexport_history.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, '.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvisualize_dashboard.js:134 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("[Dashboard] No FEISHU_EVOLVER_DASHBOARD_DOC_TOKEN set. Skipping upload.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweekly_insight.js:131 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Insight] Report saved to ${OUTPUT_FILE}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈321 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.