Skills/ClawHub/feishu-evolver-dashboard

feishu-evolver-dashboard@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Feishu-integrated wrapper for the capability-evolver. Manages the evolution loop lifecycle (start/stop/ensure), sends rich Feishu card reports, and provides..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher linbo405 · publishing for 221 daysInstalls 856Last detonated 10 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandlifecycle.js:465 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Force kill if still runningFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvisualize_dashboard.js:139 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Dashboard] Uploading to Feishu Doc: ${docToken}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionexport_history.js:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Uploading Chunk ${i+1}/${chunks.length}...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsexport_history.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, '.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvisualize_dashboard.js:134 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("[Dashboard] No FEISHU_EVOLVER_DASHBOARD_DOC_TOKEN set. Skipping upload.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedindex.js:1440 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadszh: '\u72b6\u6001: [\u6062\u590d] Solidify \u5df2\u6210\u529f\uff0c\u4f46 Hand Agent \u672a\u5199\u5165\u72b6\u6001\u6587\u4ef6\u3002\u7531 wrapper \u81ea\u52a8\u6062\u590d\u3002'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvisualize_dashboard.js:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst ENV_FILE = path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionweekly_insight.js:131 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[Insight] Report saved to ${OUTPUT_FILE}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandself-repair.js:51 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Do NOT process.exit here -- this would kill the wrapper daemon.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈321 tok
1 file · 24 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim linbo405: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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