Skills/ClawHub/fcpx-assistant

fcpx-assistant@3.0.0-beta

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Final Cut Pro X (FCPX) 助手 — 全自动视频生产(从主题到发布)、TTS 配音、素材搜集、自动成片、调色、B-roll 插入、FCP 项目管理、剪辑辅助。触发词: FCPX, FCP, Final Cut, 做视频, 自动成片, 配音, voiceover, 素材, 导入素材, 导出, 发布..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lasbder-ops · publishing for 224 daysInstalls 1,144Last detonated 2 h ago
$clawhub install fcpx-assistant
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/tts-voiceover.sh:55 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbash $0 --script-file ./script.txt --output ./voiceover/Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/auto-publish.sh:106 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- 配置文件权限设置为 600: chmod 600 $CONFIG_DIR/*.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/tts-voiceover.sh:58 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbash $0 --script-file ./script.txt --output ./voiceover/ --mergeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/audio-normalizer.sh:62 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/audio-analysis.txtFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwebui/app.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:48 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbash scripts/tts-voiceover.sh --script-file ./script.txt --output ./my-project/voiceover --mergeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/tts-voiceover.sh:6 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# bash tts-voiceover.sh --script-file ./script.txt --output ./voiceover/ --mergeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,078 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.