Skills/ClawHub/evm-wallet-clawcast

evm-wallet-clawcast@1.0.1

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "This skill is focused on crypto/EVM wallet operations and transaction workflows using cast. It covers wallet creation, importing or generating keys, checking balances, sending coins or tokens, monitoring tokens, creating and verifying transactions, and keeping agent keystores secure so the agent can guide the user through the core crypto operations a wallet handles." Observed in sandbox: sends data to foundry.paradigm.xyz.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tezatezaz · publishing for 291 daysInstalls 2,802Last detonated 59 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 41/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: sends data to foundry.paradigm.xyz.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.agent-wallet/state.env
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://foundry.paradigm.xyz:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 56: curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.3sfilesystemwrote ~/.agent-wallet/state.env
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.5sprocessexited 1:
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexited 1:
0.6sprocess8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:158 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$target" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/03_password.sh:43 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringdim "If cast prompts you, enter the password you just set."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "${APP_DIR}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:130 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/01_install_cast.sh:19 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:183 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${MNEMONIC_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:103 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:140 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/01_install_cast.sh:19 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:57 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif ! sudo sh -c "$installer > /tmp/at-install.log 2>&1"; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:196 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${PK_TMP}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/03_password.sh:73 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${KEYSTORE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/run.sh:4 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${DIR}/"*.sh || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/03_password.sh:33 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${PASSWORD_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,802 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

39 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.agent-wallet/state.env, ~/.agent-wallet/state.env.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tezatezaz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  6. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim tezatezazPropose a patch to the maintainer