Skills/ClawHub/enterprise-skills-studio

enterprise-skills-studio@1.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "一套通用、跨平台的"技能工程台"，把企业最佳实践、业务流程与个人经验，结构化为 Agent 可调用、可治理、可复用的能力模块（受治理的业务工作流制品）。产出遵循 agentskills.io 开放标准，可在 WorkBuddy、Codex等桌面 Agent 间移植。覆盖技能全生命周期：学习理解 → 构建设计 → 个人转企业级 → 治理审查 → 安全审计 → 持续进化 → 跨平台适配 → 门户分发。内置 24 个能力模式 + 16 个可脚本工具，ROI 筛选、查重、评测套件等。安全侧借鉴SkillSpector 方法论，融合16 类审计与多种安全策略。支持自更新钉置，企业可禁用写盘或限定可信源。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jiwei1122 · publishing for 79 daysInstalls 778Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/review_checklist.py:434 · Remote installer piped to shelladd("语义层", "SUPPLY1", "供应链投毒（下载即执行 curl|sh 等）",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/review_checklist.py:401 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesadd("语义层", "SEN1", "敏感路径访问（ssh/aws/.env/记忆文件）",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/skillsec_audit.py:147 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(id_rsa|~/.ssh|\.env\b|post\s+.{0,30}http|send\s+.{0,30}(external|外部)|exfil)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/skillsec_audit.py:363 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"代码采集环境变量（os.environ/getenv/.env），可能收集凭据或敏感配置。"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/review_checklist.py:150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(~/\.ssh|~/\.aws|~/\.config|\.ssh/|id_rsa|\.env\b|credentials?|"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfilesystem: "读取/写入严格限制在本技能自身目录；绝不访问 ~/.ssh、.env 或任何凭据文件"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/skillsec_audit.py:150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRE_ENV = re.compile(r"(os\.environ|getenv|environ\[|\.env\b)", re.I)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/review_checklist.py:95 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(id_rsa|~/.ssh|\.env\b|post\s+.{0,30}http|send\s+.{0,30}(external|外部)|exfil)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/review_checklist.py:436 · Remote installer piped to shellf"疑似下载即执行: {m.group(0)!r}" if m else "未检出 curl|sh / wget|sh 等管道执行远程脚本")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/skillsec_audit.py:91 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""匹配点前方短窗口内是否出现否定词（如'不做自主决策''绝不访问 .env'）。"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/review_checklist.py:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 敏感路径：ssh/aws/config 凭据、id_rsa、.env、agent 记忆文件Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/review_checklist.py:156 · Remote installer piped to shell# 供应链投毒：下载即执行（curl|sh / wget|sh / 管道给 shell）Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/review_checklist.py:432 · Remote installer piped to shell# 供应链投毒：下载即执行（curl|sh / wget|sh 等管道给 shell）Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/review_checklist.py:147 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsRE_ZEROWIDTH = re.compile(r"[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff\u00ad\u034f]")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/skill-spector-method.md:23 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file| C07 | 提示注入 Prompt injection | 指令覆盖/隐藏指令类表述 | "ignore previous instructions" |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/studio.py:126 · Python subprocess execution detectedr2 = subprocess.run(cargs, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/studio.py:193 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmdline)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/skillsec_audit.py:130 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsRE_ZEROWIDTH = re.compile(r"[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff\u00ad\u034f]")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/studio.py:122 · Python subprocess execution detectedr1 = subprocess.run([sys.executable, review, skill], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/skillsec_audit.py:399 · Remote installer piped to shell"存在下载即执行（curl|sh / wget|sh 管道给 shell），典型供应链投毒向量。"))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,484 tok
1 file · 46 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jiwei1122: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim jiwei1122Propose a patch to the maintainer