Skills/ClawHub/email-smart-reply

email-smart-reply@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "AI-powered email reply generation for B2B sales. Analyzes incoming emails to detect intent (inquiry, delivery chase, complaint, technical question, partnersh..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cjboy007 · publishing for 234 daysInstalls 839Last detonated 26 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/integration-test.js:232 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` Buttons: ✅ Send, ✏️ Edit, ❌ Discard`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/integration-test.js:253 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/discord-review.js:554 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' await sendForReview(draft);');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:127 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **OpenRouter API:** LLM intent classification (API key in `.env`)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:225 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreate a `.env` file in the skill root:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/discord-review.js:553 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' const { sendForReview } = require("./discord-review.js");');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/intent-recognition.js:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrequire('dotenv').config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,285 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cjboy007: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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