Skills/ClawHub/eda-spec2gds

eda-spec2gds@1.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Drive an open-source EDA workflow from spec to GDS using OpenClaw skills, workspace files, and CLI tools. Use when the user wants to turn a hardware spec int..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher s906903912 · publishing for 245 daysInstalls 1,268Last detonated 13 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:12 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall_script: scripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh # Optional, requires sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/SECURITY.md:94 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- Adding a user to the `docker` group grants near-root privilegesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/serve_multi_project_dashboard.py:13 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['python3', '/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/eda-spec2gds/scripts/generate_multi_project_dashboard.py'], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh:55 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo "$@"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:13 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract_ppa.py:17 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint('usage: extract_ppa.py <metrics.json> <output.json>', file=sys.stderr)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:23 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo systemctl enable --now dockerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:12 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh:48 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesrequire_cmd sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:195 · Authorization escalation language- ✅ **Development workstation** with sudo accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:22 · Authorization escalation language…cripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh`, `scripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh`) that require sudo access and modify system state. These scripts should only be run in isolated developme…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/serve_demo_artifacts.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:24 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo usermod -aG docker "$USER"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/serve_demo_artifacts.py:20 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_gds_preview.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/write_success_summary.py:15 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint('usage: write_success_summary.py <openlane-results.json> <output.md>', file=sys.stderr)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/serve_demo_artifacts.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/SECURITY.md:64 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- ⚠️ **Docker group membership**: Users in the `docker` group can effectively gain root access via container escapesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:195 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- ✅ **Development workstation** with sudo accessFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:22 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…cripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh`, `scripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh`) that require sudo access and modify system state. These scripts should only be run in isolated dev…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh:102 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SKILL_DIR"/scripts/*.sh "$SKILL_DIR"/scripts/*.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:8 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "Please run as a regular user with sudo access, not root." >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/serve_demo_artifacts.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,241 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim s906903912: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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