Skills/ClawHub/double6-pdf-translation

double6-pdf-translation@1.0.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Translate user-supplied text PDFs into Simplified Chinese and bilingual PDFs. Reads the PDF and only explicitly selected local LaTeX, sends extracted text to an explicitly approved OpenAI-compatible endpoint, runs local PDF/Python subprocesses, and writes outputs, diagnostics, and the default runtime cache under the chosen directory. Local proxy, arXiv download, Docker compilation, and external cache paths require explicit command-line opt-in." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher double6-ai · publishing for 104 daysInstalls 859Last detonated 5d ago
$clawhub install double6-pdf-translation
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/apply_glossary_edits.py:178 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesparser.add_argument("--log", help="Output human_edit_log.json. Defaults beside output.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/apply_glossary_edits.py:179 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesparser.add_argument("--affected-blocks", help="Output affected_blocks.json. Defaults beside output.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/apply_glossary_edits.py:187 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslog_path = Path(args.log) if args.log else output_path.with_name("human_edit_log.json")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/translate_with_qwen.py:390 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesparser.add_argument("--manifest", help="Run manifest path. Defaults to translation_run_manifest.json beside output.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/_subprocess_safe.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_pdf_translation.py:321 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/_subprocess_safe.py:10 · Python subprocess execution detectedWhen a caller uses ``subprocess.run(..., text=True)``, Python's readerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/latex_direct_runtime.py:749 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/_subprocess_safe.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedIntended as a drop-in replacement for ``subprocess.run(..., text=True)`` whenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/render_readable_pdf.py:118 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesparser.add_argument("--manifest", help="Output manifest JSON. Defaults to final_pdf_manifest.json beside input.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈729 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

double6-pdf-translation@1.0.5 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills