Skills/ClawHub/docs-skill-builder

docs-skill-builder@1.0.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Use when creating or refreshing a local documentation skill for another tool, SDK, API, or docs repository, with install instructions for Codex or OpenClaw." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher theangrypit · publishing for 29 daysInstalls 270Last detonated 15 h ago
$clawhub install docs-skill-builder
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.4

vet-skills diff docs-skill-builder 1.0.4 1.0.5

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.4 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.0sprocessexited 2: --doc-path <repo-path> [--doc-path <repo-path> ...]
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
0.1sprocessexec /usr/lib/git-core/git-upload-pack
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 1: could_not_detect_default_branch
0.1sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/create-docs-skill.sh:173 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$OUTPUT_DIR/scripts/generate-docs-skill.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontemplates/generate-docs-skill.tmpl.sh:212 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestsconfig*.json|vite.config.*|docusaurus.config.*|sidebars.*|postcss.config.*|babel.config.*) return 1 ;;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/create-docs-skill.sh:93 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingweb+https://*|web+http://*|*.git|*github.com/*|git@*) ;;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,788 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.